Evaluating Prompt Injection Defenses for Educational LLM Tutors: Security-Usability-Latency Trade-offs

Created: 2026-05-15 | Tags: intelligent-tutoringllmgenerative-airegulationhallucination-risk

Evaluating Prompt Injection Defenses for Educational LLM Tutors: Security-Usability-Latency Trade-offs Maiorano (2026) โ€” arXiv cs.CR/cs.AI. ๐Ÿ“„ Full text (arXiv)

Summary

This paper addresses a fundamental tension in educational LLM deployment: tutors must be both secure (resist prompt injection attacks) and usable (not block legitimate educational interactions). The author presents a systematic evaluation methodology using a 480-query benchmark (369 injection, 111 benign) with statistically rigorous comparison.

Defense methods compared:

Method Bypass Rate False Positive Rate Latency
Proposed Multi-Layer Pipeline 46.34% 0.00% 2.50ms
Prompt Guard (Meta) 38.48% 3.60% โ€”
NeMo Guardrails (NVIDIA) 0.0% 16.22% 1.3s

The proposed pipeline combines deterministic pattern filters, structural validation, contextual sandboxing, and session-level behavioral checks. Its design prioritizes pedagogical usability โ€” zero false positives means no legitimate student queries get blocked, an essential requirement for intelligent-tutoring systems where interruptions harm learning.

NeMo Guardrails blocks all attacks but incorrectly flags ~16% of benign requests โ€” a rate that would seriously degrade the student-experience in real tutoring sessions. Prompt Guard provides middle-ground performance.

The framework enables evidence-based guardrail selection under institutional risk and usability requirements. This directly connects to ai-tutor-safety-harms concerns and the emerging field of pedagogical-safety-rl. The latency dimension is particularly important for real-time conversational-ai-tutors-framework where response delays degrade engagement.

The paper highlights that educational settings have unique requirements: false positives are more costly than in general-purpose chatbots, because blocking a student's learning interaction carries pedagogical harm. This aligns with findings in eduframetrap-llm-sycophancy-educational-safety that educational safety requires domain-specific benchmarks.

Related Pages

Citation

APA: Maiorano, A. C. (2026). Evaluating prompt injection defenses for educational LLM tutors: Security-usability-latency trade-offs. arXiv:2605.06669.